Collaborative infrastructure supporting cyber-security analytics in industrial networks

ABSTRACT

A system comprising a computer-readable storage medium storing at least one program, and a method for reducing cyber-security related false positive alerts is presented. In example embodiments the method may include identifying an indication of a cyber-security threat based on an operational anomaly in a network system. The method may further include determining that the operational anomaly is a false positive indicator with respect to the cyber-security threat based on the operational anomaly being correlated with a malfunction or reconfiguration event.

PRIORITY CLAIM

This application is a continuation of and claims the benefit of priorityof U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/470,793, titled “COLLABORATIVEINFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORTING CYBER-SECURITY ANALYTICS IN INDUSTRIALNETWORKS,” filed on Aug. 27, 2014, which is hereby incorporated byreference in its entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The subject matter disclosed herein relates to data processing. Inparticular, example embodiments may relate to a collaborativeinfrastructure to maintain and support cyber-security in industrialnetwork systems.

BACKGROUND

The “Industrial Internet” refers to an integrated networked system ofcomplex physical machinery (referred to as “assets”) with embeddedsensors and advanced analytic tools configured to communicate with oneanother. As the Industrial Internet technologies evolve, a greaternumber of assets (e.g., medical equipment, aviation units, trains, andgas turbines) are integrated into cloud architectures with datacollected from the assets' embedded sensors being used by analyticengines for predictive analytics and optimizations. Although theconnectivity of these assets brings a number of productivity benefits,it also presents significant challenges in the domain of cyber-security.For example, in a widely connected environment, a “zero-day”cyber-attack that exploit unknown system vulnerabilities can generatemalware that quickly spreads through the network thereby creatingsignificant damage. The term “zero-day” stems from the fact that theseattacks sometimes take new form, going unnoticed by monitoring entities,thereby allowing no time before support engineers or software developerscan distribute a “software patch” that fixes and removes thevulnerability. To this end, there are significant efforts to enhance thecyber security infrastructures of the industrial Internet to deal withsuch threats.

For example, cyber-security analytic engines may be specificallydesigned to detect anomalies in the Industrial internet that areassociated with cyber-attacks. These engines monitor network and sensordata, assess their parameters and try to detect unusual behavioralpatterns that could signal a “zero-day” attack. However, analyticsengines that are based on behavioral patterns often suffer from higherrates of false positives compared to the targeted approach. Since thetargeted approach cannot be applied to detect a newly invented“zero-day” attack, cyber-security solutions designed to mitigate thisrisk must resort to some behavioral analysis and hence are prone to ahigher rate of false positive alerts. These false positives willpotentially trigger misleading alerts through the monitoring system,thereby leading to a series of unnecessary and even disruptive automatedor human operated action items.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Various ones of the appended drawings merely illustrate exampleembodiments of the present inventive subject matter and cannot beconsidered as limiting its scope.

FIG. 1 is an architecture diagram depicting an industrial network systemhaving a collaborative infrastructure for exchanging and analyzing data,according to an example embodiment.

FIG. 2 is an interaction diagram depicting example exchanges between acyber-security analytics engine, a collaboration interface module, andan asset analytics engine, consistent with some embodiments.

FIG. 3 is an interaction diagram depicting additional example exchangesbetween the cyber-security analytics engine, the collaboration interfacemodule, and the asset analytics engine, consistent with someembodiments.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating various modules comprising acollaboration interface module, which is provided as part of theindustrial network system, consistent with some embodiments.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting an operationalanomaly in an industrial network system, consistent with someembodiments.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method for reducing false positivealerts in an industrial network system, consistent with someembodiments.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a method for overriding malfunctionreports provided by the asset analytics engine, consistent with someembodiments.

FIG. 8 is a diagrammatic representation of a machine in the example formof a computer system within which a set of instructions for causing themachine to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed hereinmay be executed.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Reference will now be made in detail to specific example embodiments forcarrying out the inventive subject matter. Examples of these specificembodiments are illustrated in the accompanying drawings, and specificdetails are set forth in the following description in order to provide athorough understanding of the subject matter. It will be understood thatthese examples are not intended to limit the scope of the claims to theillustrated embodiments. On the contrary, they are intended to coversuch alternatives, modifications, and equivalents as may be includedwithin the scope of the disclosure.

Aspects of the present disclosure relate to a collaborativeinfrastructure for exchanging and analyzing data related to operationsof an industrial network system (those skilled in the art may also referto this as “the industrial Internet”), which is a network of integratedphysical machinery (herein referred to as “assets”) in an industrialenvironment that are communicatively coupled using sensors and software.Example embodiments may involve the detection of anomalies (e.g.,abnormal operational behavior) by a cyber-security analytics engine thatmay signal a cyber-security risk (e.g., “zero-day attack”) in theindustrial network system.

However, there are a significant number of scenarios during thelifecycle of an industrial network system in which detected anomaliesare in fact rare events of system re-configuration (e.g., a new assetbeing added or removed, components being replaced, or additional sensorsbeing installed) or inevitable malfunctions in the assets themselves,the sensors that monitor them, or the network that connects them. Someof these malfunctions may be rare, but nevertheless, may be detected byspecialized sensors or by components equipped with operational awaresoftware. Furthermore, there are asset analytics engines that havesignificant domain knowledge on the nature of the asset and so they arewell equipped to monitor and detect anomalies in the data they collectfrom the asset's sensors.

For example, analytics components used in the aviation industry areequipped with deep knowledge expertise on what a normal aircraft enginebehavior is (e.g., typical temperatures profiles for certain engineversions for the duration of liftoff, cruise or landing). Theseanalytics engines are also programmed for the obvious correlationbetween parameters such as flight altitude or geographical location andthe behavior of the engine. In a scenario where aircraft parametersmight appear as an anomaly to a cyber-security analytics engine that isbased solely on behavioral patterns, an aviation asset analytics enginewill have more insight into the behavior. Sharing of this informationwith the cyber-security analytics engine can avoid unnecessary′ falsepositive alerts. Thus, a collaborative infrastructure that provides amechanism for these devices (e.g., sensors, asset analytics engines,cyber-security engines) to communicate, as described herein, may havethe technical effect of increasing the accuracy of cyber-security alertsgenerated in industrial network systems.

Example embodiments may include a method for reducing cyber-securityfalse positive alerts in an industrial network system. These alerts,which are generated based on operational anomalies detected in theindustrial network system, may be false positives in the sense that theyindicate that a cyber-security threat is present when no actualcyber-security threat is present. Consistent with some embodiments, themethod may include identifying an operational anomaly (e.g., unusualoperational behavior) in an industrial network system, and accessingdata about the state of assets involved in the anomaly. The method mayfurther include identifying a state change (e.g., a reconfiguration ormalfunction) in the assets, and determining that the state change iscorrelated with the anomaly. Based on the correlation of the statechange and the anomaly, the method may determine that the anomaly is afalse positive with respect to indicating a cyber-security threat.

FIG. 1 is an architecture diagram depicting an industrial network system100 having a collaborative infrastructure for exchanging and analyzingdata, according to an example embodiment. As is understood by skilledartisans in the relevant computer and Internet-related arts, the modulesand engines illustrated in FIG. 1 represent a set of executable softwareinstructions and the corresponding hardware (e.g., memory and processor)for executing the instructions. To avoid obscuring the inventive subjectmatter with unnecessary detail, various functional components (e.g.,modules and engines) that are not germane to conveying an understandingof the inventive subject matter have been omitted from FIG. 1. However,a skilled artisan will readily recognize that various additionalfunctional components may be supported by the industrial network system100 to facilitate additional functionality that is not specificallydescribed herein. Furthermore, the various functional modules andengines depicted in FIG. 1 may reside on a single computer (e.g., aserver), or may be distributed across several computers in variousarrangements such as cloud-based architectures.

The industrial network system 100 is a network of integrated assets102-104 (e.g., physical machinery) with embedded sensors 106 in anindustrial environment that are configured to exchange data over thenetwork 108 using advanced controls and software applications. Each ofthe assets 102-104 may be responsible for performing one or morefunctions within the industrial environment, and the operation of theseinterconnected assets 102-104 within the industrial network system 100may be coordinated to achieve operational efficiencies. The assets102-104 may, for example, include medical equipment, aviation units,trains, vehicles, gas turbines or the like. In some embodiments, atleast some of the assets 102-104 may be or include operationally awarecomponents that are equipped with software (e.g., network orcloud-management software tools) or other intelligence to analyze andobtain domain information relating to the parameters of the asset102-104 as well as the industrial network system 100.

The sensors 106 collect data relating to various parameters of theon-going operations of the assets 102-104. The data exchanged over thenetwork 108 may include, but is not limited to, the data collected bythe sensors 106, analytic data, optimization models, network data,domain data, malfunction reports, and cyber-security alerts amongothers. In some embodiments, the network 108 may include one or morewireless access points coupled to a local area network (LAN), a \VAN,the Internet, or other packet-switched data network. In someembodiments, the network 108 may be a LAN, a WAN, the Internet, or otherpacket-switched data network. Accordingly, a variety of differentconfigurations are expressly contemplated.

As illustrated in FIG. 1, the industrial network system 100 alsoincludes a cyber-security analytics engine 110, The cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 is a network component specifically designed todetect unusual operational patterns in the industrial network system 100that are associated with cyber-attacks. To this end, the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 monitors network and sensor data of assets 102-104included in the industrial network system 100, and assesses theirparameters to determine a usual pattern of operation in the industrialnetwork system 100. The cyber-security analytics engine 110 may continueto monitor the industrial network system 100 to detect anomalies (e.g.,unusual operational patterns) in the operation of the industrial networksystem 100.

A collaboration interface module 112 supports the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 by providing interfaces to exchange detailed domaininformation regarding the network 108 and asset configurations ofrelevant portions of the industrial network system 100. For example, thecollaboration interface module 112 may provide an interface to allow thecyber-security analytics engine 110 to exchange information with one ormore asset analytics engines 114, The asset analytics engine 114 isconfigured to provide predictive analytics and optimizations of theassets 102-104 in the industrial network system 100. The asset analyticsengine 114 may monitor and analyze the status and configuration ofparameters of the industrial network system 100 to obtain asset domaindata. The asset analytics engine 114 may also detect malfunctions in theassets 102-104 and sensors 106, and issue reports identifying suchmalfunctions.

In some instances, the asset analytics engine 114 may be developed tofit the needs of a particular industrial segment, and in many instances,the asset analytics engine 114 may have access to data that thecyber-security analytics engine 110 does not. For example, an aviationasset analytics engine 114 may have knowledge on an engine type (e.g.,GE90, GE CF34, etc.), as well as additional information on configurationof the subcomponents.

At the time of any network reconfiguration event, the sensors 106, assetanalytics engine 114, and other operationally aware components (e.g.,components equipped with network or cloud management tools) in theindustrial network system 100 may pass information about these changesthrough the collaboration interface module 112. In turn, thecollaboration interface module 112 may analyze this information tocorrelate potential anomalies detected by the cyber-security analyticsengine 110 with changes in the network 108 that are rationalizedanomalies. In this manner, the collaboration interface module 112assists the cyber-security analytics engine 110 in minimizing or atleast reducing the number of cyber-security threat related falsepositives.

The collaboration interface module 112 may also provide a number ofinterfaces to notify subscribed listeners (e.g., the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110) on the state of the assets 102-104. Theseinterfaces may further allow the cyber-security analytics engine 110 orother subscribed components or entities to query (e.g., the assetanalytics engine 114) for the state of the assets 102-104. For example,in instances in which the cyber-security analytics engine 110 detects anoperational anomaly that signals a potential cyber-security threat, thecyber-security analytics engine 110 may utilize the collaborationinterface module 112 to query the asset analytics engine 114 foradditional information before issuing a cyber-security alert. In thisway, the cyber-security analytics engine 110 may correlate a detectedoperational anomaly with decisions backed up by the domain knowledge ofthe asset analytics engine 114. In some instances, the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 may avoid issuing a cyber-security alert if adetected operational anomaly is well correlated (e.g., time-correlated)with a well understood change in an asset (e.g., asset 102-104) reportedby the asset analytics engine 114. In these instances, the collaborationinterface module 112 may record information related to the correlationbetween the anomaly and the asset change so as to enable thecyber-security analytics engine 110 to adapt future analysis and learnfrom these incidents.

The collaboration interface module 112 may also provide thecyber-security analytics engine 110 with a detailed set of informationgenerated by the asset analytics engine 114 that relates to certaindecision making processes involving machine learning algorithms. Thisinformation may include relevant parameters and their respective statesand associations as well as decision rules and models that are used bythe asset analytics engine 114. For example, in embodiments in which theasset analytics engine 114 corresponds to a locomotive analytics engine,the collaboration interface module 112 may obtain and provision (e.g.,to the cyber-security analytics engine 110) information relating to thestate of the locomotive (e.g., the asset 102-104) as well as a specificconfiguration of asset parameters that triggered the state of thelocomotive. In the locomotive example; these parameters may includespeed, gear, pressure, temperature, oil pressure, or the like.

The collaboration interface module 112 may also be operable to overruledecisions of the asset analytics engine 114 and provide a notificationto the cyber-security analytics engine 110 that the cause of an apparentasset malfunction is in fact a cyber-attack. In some embodiments, thecollaboration interface module 112 may directly overrule thesedecisions, while in other embodiments; the collaboration interfacemodule 112 simply provides information to the cyber-security analyticsengine 110 that causes the cyber-security analytics engine 110 tooverrule the decisions of the asset analytics engine 114.

While the collaboration interface module 112 is shown in FIG. 1 to formpart of a service that is separate and distinct from the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110, it will be appreciated that, in alternativeembodiments, the collaboration interface module 112 may be embedded orotherwise included as part of the cyber-security analytics engine 110.Further, while FIG. 1 provides an example architecture that isconsistent with some embodiments, the presented inventive subject matteris not limited to the architecture illustrated in FIG. 1, and mayequally well find application in a client-server architecture, anevent-driven, distributed, or peer-to-peer architecture system, forexample. It shall also be appreciated that although various componentsof the industrial network system 100 are discussed in the singularsense, multiple instances of one or more of the various functionalcomponents may be employed. Similarly, although the industrial networksystem 100 illustrated in FIG. 1 includes only assets 102-104, inalternative embodiments, the industrial network system 100 may includefewer or additional assets.

FIG. 2 is an interaction diagram depicting example exchanges between acyber-security analytics engine 110, a collaboration interface module112, and an asset analytics engine 114, consistent with someembodiments. As shown, the process begins at operation 202 with thecyber-security analytics engine 110 detecting an operational anomalythat signals a potential cyber-security threat to the industrial networksystem 100. The detecting of the anomaly may be based on one or more ofthe assets 102-104 comprising the industrial network system 100, eitherindividually or in conjunction, operating in a manner that isinconsistent with the normal operational pattern observed in theindustrial network system 100. At operation 204, the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 may update an anomaly flag (e.g., a code embeddedin data that signals the existence of an operational anomaly), which iscommunicated to the collaboration interface module 112 at operation 204.The anomaly flag signals the detection of an anomaly and may specify atime in which the anomaly occurred and the assets involved in theanomaly. In some embodiments, the cyber-security analytics engine 110and collaboration interface module 112 may be configured to communicatedata according to a publisher-subscriber pattern whereby thecollaboration interface module 112 may subscribe to data relating toanomaly flags, which is published and produced by the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 based on the detection of the anomaly.

At operation 206, the collaboration interface module 112 may access theanomaly flag. At operation 208, the collaboration interface module 112may access asset domain data from the asset analytics engine 114 inresponse to the anomaly flag. The asset domain data may includeinformation related to various states (e.g., current and historical) ofassets involved in the anomaly, and the configuration of the respectiveparameters of each these assets.

At operation 210, the asset analytics engine 114 may access therequested asset domain data. The asset domain data may be informationcollected and stored by the asset analytics engine 114 from the sensors106 and other domain-aware components embedded in the assets 102-104. Atoperation 212, the asset analytics engine 114 may communicate the assetdomain data to the collaboration interface module 112.

At operation 214, the collaboration interface module 112 may identify astate change in one or more of the assets 102-104 from the asset domaindata. The state change may, for example, be due to user initiatedchanges in the industrial network system 100. At operation 216, thecollaboration interface module 112 may determine an anomaly is a falsepositive with respect to the cyber-security threat based on the statechange being time correlated with the anomaly. In response todetermining that the anomaly is a false positive, the collaborationinterface module 112 requests that the cyber-security analytics engine110 clears the anomaly flag, at operation 218. At operation 220, thecyber-security analytics engine 110 clears the anomaly flag in responseto the request from the collaboration interface module 112, In instancesin which the collaboration interface module 112 does not determine theanomaly is a false positive, the anomaly flag will not be cleared, andthe cyber-security analytics engine 110 may issue an anomaly alert tonetwork administrators to indicate a potential cyber-security threat(e.g., a cyber-attack).

FIG. 3 is an interaction diagram depicting additional example exchangesbetween the cyber-security analytics engine 110, the collaborationinterface module 112, and the asset analytics engine 114, consistentwith some embodiments. As shown, the process begins at operation 302 atwhich point the asset analytics engine 114 may detect malfunctions inmultiple assets (e.g., assets 102-104) of the industrial network system100. At operation 304, the asset analytics engine 114 issues reportsidentifying the detected malfunctions. In addition, the reports mayspecify particular components involved in the malfunction, theirrespective configurations, and the times in which the malfunctionsoccurred.

At operation 306, the collaboration interface module 112 accesses thereports identifying the malfunctions of the multiple assets 102-104. Atoperation 308, the collaboration interface module 112 may determine thatthe malfunctions are associated with a cyber-attack. For example, thecollaboration interface module 112 may determine that the malfunctionsare associated with a cyber-attack based on the malfunctions of themultiple assets being identical or of the same nature, and occurring atsubstantially the same time. Based on determining that the malfunctionsare associated with a cyber-attack, the collaboration interface module112 may override the reports identifying the malfunctions of themultiple assets, at operation 310. In turn, the asset analytics engine114 clears the reports at operation 312.

At operation 314, the collaboration interface module 112 provides anotification of the cyber-attack to the cyber-security analytics engine110, In turn, the cyber-security analytics engine 110 issues acyber-security alert identifying the cyber-attack at operation 316. Thecyber-security analytics engine 110 may provide the cyber-security alertto administrators of the industrial network system 100 or any otherentity subscribed to the services of the cyber-security analytics engine110.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating various modules comprising acollaboration interface module 112, which is provided as part of theindustrial network system 100, consistent with some embodiments. In someembodiments, the modules illustrated in FIG. 4 represent a set ofexecutable software instructions and the corresponding hardware (e.g.,memory and processor) for executing the instructions. Further, it shallbe appreciated that while the modules of FIG. 4 are discussed in thesingular sense, in other embodiments multiple instances of one or moreof the modules may be employed.

The collaboration interface module 112 is shown as including a listenermodule 400, an query module 402, an analysis module 404, and a clearingmodule 406, all configured to communicate with each other (e.g., via abus, shared memory, a switch, or application programming interfaces(APIs)). The aforementioned modules of the collaboration interfacemodule 112 may, furthermore, access one or more databases that are partof the industrial network system 100, and each of the modules may becapable of communication with the other components of the industrialnetwork system 100 (e.g., assets 102-104, cyber-security analyticsengine 110, and asset analytics engine 114).

The listener module 400 may be configured to access various dataproduced by components of the industrial network system 100. Forexample, the listener module 400 may access information produced by thecyber-security analytics engine 110 relating to cyber-security threatsand attacks to the industrial network system 100. This information mayidentify potential cyber-security threats or attacks, the timing of suchattacks or threats, and the assets or components involved in or affectedby the threat or attack. Other examples of data accessed by the listenermodule 400 may include reports or alerts provided by the asset analyticsengine 114 relating to the malfunction of assets or other components ofthe industrial network system 100.

The query module 402 may be configured to query components of theindustrial network system 100 for information. These queries may be inresponse to a request for such from another component, or in response toan event occurring in the industrial network system 100. For example, inresponse to the cyber-security analytics engine 110 detecting anoperational anomaly in the industrial network system 100, the querymodule 402 may query the asset analytics engine 114 or an operationallyaware component for domain data including information about the natureof an asset or set of assets (e.g., involved in the operational anomaly)such as asset state and configuration of asset parameters.

The analysis module 404 may be configured to analyze various datarelated to the operation of the industrial network system 100 to makedeterminations regarding cyber-security issues. For example, theanalysis module 404 may analyze asset domain data obtained from theasset analytics engine 114 to identify changes in an asset state such asa reconfiguration of asset parameters. The analysis module 404 mayfurther identify a correlation between the change in state and ananomaly detected by the cyber-security analytics engine 110. Upondetermining that the change in state and anomaly are correlated, theanalysis module 404 may determine that the detected anomaly is a falsepositive with respect to a potential cyber-security threat.

The clearing module 406 may be configured to signal the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 to clear an anomaly flag in response to adetermination that a corresponding anomaly is a false positive. Theclearing module 406 may also be configured to signal the asset analyticsengine 114 to clear reports of asset malfunction based on adetermination that the malfunctions are associated with a cyber-attack.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting an operationalanomaly in an industrial network system 100, consistent with someembodiments. The method 500 may be embodied in computer-readableinstructions for execution by one or more processors such that the stepsof the method 500 may be performed in part or in whole by the componentsof the cyber-security analytics engine 110, and accordingly, the method500 is described below by way of example with reference thereto.However, it shall be appreciated that the method 500 may be deployed onvarious other hardware configurations and is not intended to be limitedto the cyber-security analytics engine 110.

At operation 505, the cyber-security analytics engine 110 monitorsoperation of the industrial network system 100. The monitoring of theoperation of the industrial network system 100 by the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 may include monitoring network data (e.g.,intercept and log traffic passing over the industrial network system100), and data received from asset sensors (e.g., sensors 106). Atoperation 510, the cyber-security analytics engine 110 determines anormal operation pattern of the industrial network system 100 based onthe monitoring. The normal operation pattern may include the variousattributes and parameters of the industrial network system 100 and eachof its components during normal operation.

At operation 515, the cyber-security analytics engine 110, whilecontinuing to monitor the industrial network system 100, detects anabnormal operation in the industrial network system 100. The detectingof the abnormal operation of the industrial network system 100 maycomprises determining that one or more parameters or attributes of theindustrial network system 100 is inconsistent or otherwise not inaccordance with the normal operation pattern determined at operation510, Based on detecting the abnormal operation in the industrial networksystem 100, the cyber-security analytics engine 110 updates an anomalyflag at operation 520 to signify an abnormal operation in the industrialnetwork system 100, which may signal a cyber-attack or othercyber-security threat.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method 600 for reducing falsepositive alerts in an industrial network system 100, consistent withsome embodiments. The method 600 may be embodied in computer-readableinstructions for execution by one or more processors such that the stepsof the method 600 may be performed in part or in whole by the componentsof collaboration interface module 112, and accordingly, the method 600is described below by way of example with reference thereto. However, itshall be appreciated that the method 600 may be deployed on variousother hardware configurations and is not intended to be limited to thecollaboration interface module 112.

At operation 605, the listener module 400 may identify an operationalanomaly in the industrial network system 100. The operational anomalymay signal a potential cyber-security related threat to the industrialnetwork system 100. The identifying of the operational anomaly may bebased on one or more anomaly flags maintained by the cyber-securityanalytics engine 110 indicating that an abnormal operation pattern hasbeen detected in the industrial network system 100.

At operation 610, the analysis module 404 may identify an asset (e.g.,assets 102-104) involved in the operational anomaly (e.g., based oninformation provided by the cyber-security analytics engine 110), Atoperation 615, the query module 402 may access asset domain data for theasset from the asset analytics engine 114. The asset domain dataincludes historical and current information about the nature of theasset such as a state of the asset and configuration of assetparameters. In embodiments in which the identified asset is equippedwith operationally aware software (e.g., network or cloud managementtools), the asset domain data may be obtained directly identified asset.

At operation 620, the analysis module 404 analyzes the asset domain datato identify a state change in the asset 102-104. For example, the statechange in the asset may be based on a system reconfiguration event suchas a new asset being added or removed from the industrial network system100, asset components being replaced, or additional sensors beinginstalled. As another example, the state change in the asset may bebased on a malfunction in the asset, in a sensor that monitors theasset, or a malfunction in the network 108.

At operation 625, the analysis module 404 determines that theoperational anomaly is correlated with the state change. For example,the analysis module 404 may determine that the operational anomaly andthe state change are time-correlated both occurring within apredetermined time period). The determination that the operationalanomaly and the state change are time correlated may include comparingthe respective timing of the operational anomaly and the state change(e.g., based on information included in the anomaly flag and the assetdomain data), and determining that the operational anomaly and the statechange both occurred within a certain time period (e.g., within 30seconds of one another). Based on the determination that the operationalanomaly and the state change are correlated, the analysis module 404determines that the operational anomaly is a false positive with respectto signaling a potential cyber-security threat, at operation 630. Stateddifferently, at operation 630, the analysis module 404 determines thatthe operation anomaly does not indicate a potential cyber-securitythreat.

At operation 635, the clearing module 406 clears an anomaly flagassociated with the operational anomaly identified at operation 605. Insome embodiments, the clearing module 406 may directly clear the anomalyflag, while in other embodiments the clearing module 406 may signal thecyber-security analytics engine 110 to clear the anomaly flag. Atoperation 640, the clearing module 406 may store a record of theoperational anomaly, the state change, and an indicator of the falsepositive so as to provide the collaboration interface module 112 theability to learn from the from the false positive, and avoid similarfalse positive alerts in future situations with similar parameters.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a method 700 for overridingmalfunction reports provided by the asset analytics engine 114,consistent with some embodiments. The method 700 may be embodied incomputer-readable instructions for execution by one or more processorssuch that the steps of the method 700 may be performed in part or inwhole by the components of collaboration interface module 112, andaccordingly, the method 500 is described below by way of example withreference thereto. However, it shall be appreciated that the method 700may be deployed on various other hardware configurations and is notintended to be limited to the collaboration interface module 112.

At operation 705, the listener module 400 may access a first reportidentifying a malfunction of a first asset 102-104 in the industrialnetwork system 100. At operation 710, the listener module 400 may accessa second report identifying a malfunction of a second asset in theindustrial network system 100. The first and second reports may begenerated by one or more asset analytics engines (e.g., asset analyticsengine 114) responsible for monitoring and assessing the parameters ofthe first and second assets, respectively or in conjunction. The reportsmay identify the assets, and provide details regarding the malfunction(e.g., timing and specific components involved in the malfunction).

At operation 715, the collaboration interface module 112 in conjunctionwith the cyber-security analytics engine 110 determines that themalfunctions of the first and second assets are associated with acyber-attack. For example, based on information received from the assetanalytics engine 114, the collaboration interface module 112 maydetermine that the reported malfunction of the first and second asset isthe exact same malfunction of the same nature. Based on theunlikeliness, and in some instances impossibility, of such concurrentmalfunctions, the collaboration interface module 112 may determine thatthe malfunction is in fact a cyber-attack.

At operation 720, the collaboration interface module 112 may overridethe first and second reports based on determining that the reportedmalfunctions are instead an associated cyber-attack. In some instances,upon determining that the concurrent malfunctions are associated with acyber-attack, the cyber-security analytics engine 110 may provide acyber-security alert to an administrator of the industrial networksystem 100 to signal the potential cyber-attack.

Modules, Components and Logic

Certain embodiments are described herein as including logic or a numberof components, modules, or mechanisms. Modules may constitute eithersoftware modules (e.g., code embodied on a machine-readable medium or ina transmission signal) or hardware modules. A hardware module is atangible unit capable of performing certain operations and may beconfigured or arranged in a certain manner. In example embodiments, oneor more computer systems (e.g., a standalone, client, or server computersystem) or one or more hardware modules of a computer system (e.g., aprocessor or a group of processors) may be configured by software (e.g.,an application or application portion) as a hardware module thatoperates to perform certain operations as described herein.

In various embodiments, a hardware module may be implementedmechanically or electronically. For example, a hardware module maycomprise dedicated circuitry or logic that is permanently configured(e.g., as a special-purpose processor, such as a field-programmable gatearray (FPGA) or an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)) toperform certain operations. A hardware module may also compriseprogrammable logic or circuitry (e.g., as encompassed within ageneral-purpose processor or other programmable processor) that istemporarily configured by software to perform certain operations. Itwill be appreciated that the decision to implement a hardware modulemechanically, in dedicated and permanently configured circuitry, or intemporarily configured circuitry (e.g., configured by software) may bedriven by cost and time considerations.

Accordingly, the term “hardware module” should be understood toencompass a tangible entity, be that an entity that is physicallyconstructed, permanently configured (e.g., hardwired) or temporarilyconfigured (e.g., programmed) to operate in a certain manner and/or toperform certain operations described herein. Considering embodiments inwhich hardware modules are temporarily configured (e.g., programmed),each of the hardware modules need not be configured or instantiated atany one instance in time. For example, where the hardware modulescomprise a general-purpose processor configured using software, thegeneral-purpose processor may be configured as respective differenthardware modules at different times. Software may accordingly configurea processor, for example, to constitute a particular hardware module atone instance of time and to constitute a different hardware module at adifferent instance of time.

Hardware modules can provide information to, and receive informationfrom, other hardware modules. Accordingly, the described hardwaremodules may be regarded as being communicatively coupled. Where multipleof such hardware modules exist contemporaneously, communications may beachieved through signal transmission (e.g., over appropriate circuitsand buses that connect the hardware modules). In embodiments in whichmultiple hardware modules are configured or instantiated at differenttimes, communications between such hardware modules may be achieved, forexample, through the storage and retrieval of information in memorystructures to which the multiple hardware modules have access. Forexample, one hardware module may perform an operation and store theoutput of that operation in a memory device to which it iscommunicatively coupled. A further hardware module may then, at a latertime, access the memory device to retrieve and process the storedoutput. Hardware modules may also initiate communications with input oroutput devices, and can operate on a resource (e.g., a collection ofinformation).

The various operations of example methods described herein may beperformed, at least partially, by one or more processors that aretemporarily configured (e.g., by software) or permanently configured toperform the relevant operations. Whether temporarily or permanentlyconfigured, such processors may constitute processor-implemented modulesthat operate to perform one or more operations or functions. The modulesreferred to herein may, in some example embodiments, compriseprocessor-implemented modules.

Similarly, the methods described herein may be at least partiallyprocessor-implemented. For example, at least some of the operations of amethod may be performed by one or more processors orprocessor-implemented modules. The performance of certain of theoperations may be distributed among the one or more processors, not onlyresiding within a single machine, but deployed across a number ofmachines. In some example embodiments, the processor or processors maybe located in a single location (e.g., within a home environment, anoffice environment, or a server farm), while in other embodiments theprocessors may be distributed across a number of locations.

The one or more processors may also operate to support performance ofthe relevant operations in a “cloud computing” environment or as a“software as a service” (SaaS). For example, at least some of theoperations may be performed by a group of computers (as examples ofmachines including processors), with these operations being accessiblevia a network (e.g., the Internet) and via one or more appropriateinterfaces (e.g., APIs).

Electronic Apparatus and System

Example embodiments may be implemented in digital electronic circuitry,or in computer hardware, firmware, or software, or in combinations ofthem. Example embodiments may be implemented using a computer programproduct, for example, a computer program tangibly embodied in aninformation carrier, for example, in a machine-readable medium forexecution by, or to control the operation of, data processing apparatus,for example, a programmable processor, a computer, or multiplecomputers.

A computer program can be written in any form of programming language,including compiled or interpreted languages, and it can be deployed inany form, including as a standalone program or as a module, subroutine,or other unit suitable for use in a computing environment. A computerprogram can be deployed to be executed on one computer or on multiplecomputers at one site, or distributed across multiple sites andinterconnected by a communication network.

In example embodiments, operations may be performed by one or moreprogrammable processors executing a computer program to performfunctions by operating on input data and generating output. Methodoperations can also be performed by, and apparatus of exampleembodiments may be implemented as, special purpose logic circuitry(e.g., an FPGA, or an ASIC).

The computing system can include clients and servers. A client andserver are generally remote from each other and typically interactthrough a communication network. The relationship of client and serverarises by virtue of computer programs running on the respectivecomputers and having a client-server relationship to each other. Inembodiments deploying a programmable computing system, it will beappreciated that both hardware and software architectures meritconsideration. Specifically, it will be appreciated that the choice ofwhether to implement certain functionality in permanently configuredhardware (e.g., an ASIC), in temporarily configured hardware (e.g., acombination of software and a programmable processor), or in acombination of permanently and temporarily configured hardware may be adesign choice. Below are set out hardware (e.g., machine) and softwarearchitectures that may be deployed, in various example embodiments.

Machine Architecture and Machine-Readable Medium

FIG. 8 is a diagrammatic representation of a machine in the example formof a computer system 800 within which a set of instructions for causingthe machine to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussedherein may be executed. The computer system 800 may correspond to any ofthe cyber-security analytics engine 110, the collaboration interfacemodule 112, or the asset analytics engine 114, consistent with someembodiments. The computer system 800 may include instructions forcausing the machine to perform any one or more of the methodologiesdiscussed herein. In alternative embodiments, the machine operates as astandalone device or may be connected (e.g., networked) to othermachines. In a networked deployment, the machine may operate in thecapacity of a server or a client machine in a server-client networkenvironment, or as a peer machine in a peer-to-peer (or distributed)network environment. The machine may be a personal computer (PC), a PDA,a cellular telephone, a smart phone (e.g., iPhone®), a tablet computer,a web appliance, a handheld computer, a desktop computer, a laptop ornetbook, a set-top box (STB) such as provided by cable or satellitecontent providers, a wearable computing device such as glasses or awristwatch, a multimedia device embedded in an automobile, a GlobalPositioning System (GPS) device, a data enabled book reader, a videogame system console, a network router, switch or bridge, or any machinecapable of executing instructions (sequential or otherwise) that specifyactions to be taken by that machine. Further, while only a singlemachine is illustrated, the term “machine” shall also be taken toinclude any collection of machines that individually or jointly executea set (or multiple sets) of instructions to perform any one or more ofthe methodologies discussed herein.

The example computer system 800 includes a processor 802 (e.g., acentral processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), orboth), a main memory 804, and a static memory 806, which communicatewith each other via a bus 808. The computer system 800 may furtherinclude a video display 810 (e.g., a liquid crystal display (LCD) or acathode ray tube (CRT)). The computer system 800 also includes one ormore input/output (I/O) devices 812, a location component 814, a driveunit 816, a signal generation device 818 (e.g., a speaker), and anetwork interface device 820. The I/O devices 812 may, for example,include a keyboard, a mouse, a keypad, a multi-touch surface (e.g., atouchscreen or track pad), a microphone, a camera, and the like.

The location component 814 may be used for determining a location of thecomputer system 800. In some embodiments, the location component 814 maycorrespond to a GPS transceiver that may make use of the networkinterface device 820 to communicate GPS signals with a GPS satellite.The location component 814 may also be configured to determine alocation of the computer system 800 by using an Internet protocol (IP)address lookup or by triangulating a position based on nearby mobilecommunications towers. The location component 814 may be furtherconfigured to store a user-defined location in main memory 804 or staticmemory 806. In some embodiments, a mobile location enabled applicationmay work in conjunction with the location component 814 and the networkinterface device 820 to transmit the location of the computer system 800to an application server or third party server for the purpose ofidentifying the location of a user operating the computer system 800.

In some embodiments, the network interface device 820 may correspond toa transceiver and antenna. The transceiver may be configured to bothtransmit and receive cellular network signals, wireless data signals, orother types of signals via the antenna, depending on the nature of thecomputer system 800.

Machine-Readable Medium

The drive unit 816 includes a machine-readable medium 822 on which isstored one or more sets of data structures and instructions 824 (e.g.,software) embodying or used by any one or more of the methodologies orfunctions described herein. The instructions 824 may also reside,completely or at least partially, within the main memory 804, the staticmemory 806, and/or the processor 802 during execution thereof by thecomputer system 800, with the main memory 804, the static memory 806,and the processor 802 also constituting machine-readable media 822.

Consistent with some embodiments, the instructions 824 may relate to theoperations of an operating system (OS). Depending on the particular typeof the computer system 800, the OS may, for example, be the iOS®operating system, the Android® operating system, a BlackBerry® operatingsystem, the Microsoft® Windows® Phone operating system, Symbian® OS, orwebOS®. Further, the instructions 824 may relate to operations performedby applications (commonly known as “apps”), consistent with someembodiments. One example of such an application is a mobile browserapplication that displays content, such as a web page or a userinterface using a browser.

While the machine-readable medium 822 is shown in an example embodimentto be a single medium, the term “machine-readable medium” may include asingle medium or multiple media (e.g., a centralized or distributeddatabase, and/or associated caches and servers) that store the one ormore data structures or instructions 824. The term “machine-readablemedium” shall also be taken to include any tangible medium that iscapable of storing, encoding, or carrying instructions (e.g.,instructions 824) for execution by the machine and that cause themachine to perform any one or more of the methodologies of the presentdisclosure, or that is capable of storing, encoding or carrying datastructures used by or associated with such instructions 824. The term“machine-readable medium” shall accordingly be taken to include, but notbe limited to, solid-state memories, and optical and magnetic media.Specific examples of machine-readable media 822 include non-volatilememory, including by way of example semiconductor memory devices (e.g.,erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasableprogrammable read-only memory (EEPROM)) and flash memory devices;magnetic disks such as internal hard disks and removable disks;magneto-optical disks; and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM disks.

Furthermore, the tangible machine-readable medium 822 is non-transitoryin that it does not embody a propagating signal. However, labeling thetangible machine-readable medium 822 “non-transitory” should not beconstrued to mean that the medium is incapable of movement—the mediumshould be considered as being transportable from one real-world locationto another. Additionally, since the machine-readable medium 822 istangible, the medium may be considered to be a machine-readable device.

Transmission Medium

The instructions 824 may further be transmitted or received over anetwork 826 using a transmission medium. The instructions 824 may betransmitted using the network interface device 820 and any one of anumber of well-known transfer protocols (e.g., HTTP) Examples ofcommunication networks include a LAN, a WAN, the Internet, mobiletelephone networks, plain old telephone service (POTS) networks, andwireless data networks (e.g., WiFi and WiMax networks), The term“transmission medium” shall be taken to include any intangible mediumthat is capable of storing, encoding, or carrying the instructions 824for execution by the machine, and includes digital or analogcommunications signals or other intangible media to facilitatecommunication of such software.

Although the embodiments of the present invention have been describedwith reference to specific example embodiments, it will be evident thatvarious modifications and changes may be made to these embodimentswithout departing from the broader scope of the inventive subjectmatter. Accordingly, the specification and drawings are to be regardedin an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense. The accompanyingdrawings that form a part hereof show by way of illustration, and not oflimitation, specific embodiments in which the subject matter may bepracticed. The embodiments illustrated are described in sufficientdetail to enable those skilled in the art to practice the teachingsdisclosed herein. Other embodiments may be used and derived therefrom,such that structural and logical substitutions and changes may be madewithout departing from the scope of this disclosure. This DetailedDescription, therefore, is not to be taken in a limiting sense, and thescope of various embodiments is defined only by the appended claims,along with the full range of equivalents to which such claims areentitled.

Such embodiments of the inventive subject matter may be referred toherein, individually and/or collectively, by the term “invention” merelyfor convenience and without intending to voluntarily limit the scope ofthis application to any single invention or inventive concept if morethan one is in fact disclosed. Thus, although specific embodiments havebeen illustrated and described herein, it should be appreciated that anyarrangement calculated to achieve the same purpose may be substitutedfor the specific embodiments shown. This disclosure is intended to coverany and all adaptations or variations of various embodiments.Combinations of the above embodiments, and other embodiments notspecifically described herein, will be apparent to those of skill in theart upon reviewing the above description.

All publications, patents, and patent documents referred to in thisdocument are incorporated by reference herein in their entirety, asthough individually incorporated by reference. In the event ofinconsistent usages between this document and those documents soincorporated by reference, the usage in the incorporated referencesshould be considered supplementary to that of this document; forirreconcilable inconsistencies, the usage in this document controls.

In this document, the terms “a” or “an” are used, as is common in patentdocuments, to include one or more than one, independent of any otherinstances or usages of “at least one” or “one or more.” In thisdocument, the term “or” is used to refer to a nonexclusive or, such that“A or B” includes “A but not B,” “B but not A,” and “A and B,” unlessotherwise indicated. In the appended claims, the terms “including” and“in which” are used as the plain-English equivalents of the respectiveterms “comprising” and “wherein.” Also, in the following claims, theterms “including” and “comprising” are open-ended; that is, a system,device, article, or process that includes elements in addition to thoselisted after such a term in a claim are still deemed to fall within thescope of that claim.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: identifying an indication ofa cyber-security threat to a network system based on an operationalanomaly that includes an operation pattern that is inconsistent with anormal operation pattern observed in the network system; identifying amalfunction or reconfiguration event associated with an asset;determining, by at least one processor, that the operational anomaly isa false positive with respect to the potential cyber-security threatbased on the operational anomaly being correlated with the malfunctionor reconfiguration event; clearing the indication based on thedetermining that the anomaly is a false positive; and causing a recordto be stored in a database, the record comprising: the operationalanomaly, information associated with the malfunction or reconfigurationevent, and information associated with the determining that the anomalyis a false positive.
 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: inresponse to identifying the indication of the cyber-security threat,accessing asset domain data of an asset in the network system, theidentifying of the malfunction or reconfiguration event being based onthe asset domain data.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the assetdomain data is accessed from an asset analytics engine configured tomonitor a status and parameter configuration of the asset.
 4. The methodof claim 1, wherein the identifying the indication includes detecting ananomaly flag being updated by a cyber-security analytics engine inresponse to detecting the operational anomaly.
 5. The method of claim 4,wherein the detecting of the operational anomaly by the cyber-securityanalytics engine comprises: monitoring operation of the network system;determining the normal operation pattern of the network system; anddetecting the operation pattern that is inconsistent with the normaloperation pattern of the network system.
 6. The method of claim 4,wherein clearing the indication includes transmitting a signal to thecyber security engine to clear the anomaly flag.
 7. The method of claim1, wherein the determining the operational anomaly is a false positiveincludes determining that the operational anomaly and thereconfiguration event or malfunction are time-correlated.
 8. The methodof claim 7, wherein the determining that the operational anomaly and thereconfiguration event or malfunction are time-correlated includesdetermining the reconfiguration event or malfunction and the operationalanomaly occurred within a certain time period.
 9. The method of claim 1,wherein the network system is an industrial network system comprisingphysical machinery with embedded sensors.
 10. The method of claim 1,wherein the reconfiguration event includes at least one of adding theasset to the network system, removing the asset from the network system,replacing a component of the asset, or adding an additional asset to thenetwork system.
 11. A system comprising: one or more processors of amachine; and a machine-readable medium storing instructions that, whenexecuted by the one or more processors, cause the machine to performoperations comprising: identifying an indication of a cyber-securitythreat to a network system based on an operational anomaly that includesan operation pattern that is inconsistent with a normal operationpattern observed in the network system; identifying a malfunction orreconfiguration event associated with an asset; determining that theoperational anomaly is a false positive with respect to the potentialcyber-security threat based on the operational anomaly being correlatedwith the malfunction or reconfiguration event; clearing the indicationbased on the determining that the anomaly is a false positive; andcausing a record to be stored in a database, the record comprising: theoperational anomaly, information associated with the malfunction orreconfiguration event, and information associated with the determiningthat the anomaly is a false positive.
 12. The system of claim 11,wherein the operations further comprise: in response to identifying theindication of the cyber-security threat, accessing asset domain data ofan asset in the network system, the identifying of the malfunction orreconfiguration event being based on the asset domain data.
 13. Thesystem of claim 12, wherein the asset domain data is accessed from anasset analytics engine configured to monitor a status and parameterconfiguration of the asset.
 14. The system of claim 13, wherein theasset is coupled to a plurality of sensors, and wherein the assetanalytics engine monitors the plurality of sensors to generate the assetdomain data.
 15. The system of claim 11, further comprising acyber-security analytics engine in communication with the machine, thecyber-security analytics engine configured to perform operationscomprising: monitoring operation of the network system; determining thenormal operation pattern of the network system; detecting theoperational anomaly; and updating an anomaly flag in response todetecting the operational anomaly, the anomaly flag signaling thedetection of the operational anomaly.
 16. The system of claim 15,wherein identifying the indication of the cyber-security threat includesaccessing the anomaly flag.
 17. The system of claim 15, wherein clearingthe indication includes transmitting a signal to the cyber securityengine to clear the anomaly flag.
 18. The system of claim 11, whereindetermining that the operational anomaly is a false positive includescomparing respective timings of reconfiguration event or malfunction andthe operational anomaly.
 19. The system of claim 11, wherein thereconfiguration event includes at least one of adding the asset to thenetwork system, removing the asset from the network system, replacing acomponent of the asset, or adding an additional asset to the networksystem.
 20. A non-transitory machine-readable storage medium embodyinginstructions that, when executed by at least one processor of a machine,cause the machine to perform operations comprising: identifying anindication of a cyber-security threat to a network system based on anoperational anomaly that includes an operation pattern that isinconsistent with a normal operation pattern observed in the networksystem; identifying a malfunction or reconfiguration event associatedwith an asset; determining that the operational anomaly is a falsepositive with respect to the potential cyber-security threat based onthe operational anomaly being correlated with the malfunction orreconfiguration event; clearing the indication based on the determiningthat the anomaly is a false positive; and causing a record to be storedin a database, the record comprising: the operational anomaly,information associated with the malfunction or reconfiguration event,and information associated with the determining that the anomaly is afalse positive.